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DEVELOPMENTS IN NEWSPAPER LIBEL

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NEWSPAPER LIBEL
By

ROBERT

H.

WETTACH*

O paper
the front page of the Columbia Record, an afternoon
published in Columbia, S. C., the following article
N

appeared
"Facstmile of a Letter fron Senator T C. Duncan to Edunn IW'
Robertson, of Columbia.
"Senator Duncan is a member of the Canal Commission. He
was appointed a member of the commission on March 23, 1923.
The act creating the commission was passed by the General Assembly during the session of 1923, and was approved March 26,
1923. Senator Duncan's letter is dated March 28, 1923. The loan
solicited was not granted. The first meeting of the Canal Commission was held in Columbia April 13, 1923.
"After five days return to T. C. Duncan, Union, S. C. To E.
W Robertson, c/o Loan & Exchange Nat. Bank.
"Personal.
"T. C. Duncan, Union, S. C. To E. W Robertson, Columbia,
S. C. March 28, 1923.
"Dear Sir- I would like to secure a loan of $25,000.00-for
three years-interest payable semiannually I have security worth
six times the amount of loan desired.
"I will be glad for you to have your representative to inspect
the property that I would offer as collateral-I can make loan
from a bank, but I do not desire the constant renewal of paper I
have Building & Loan stock that will mature in three years, by
means of which loan will be paid at maturity.
"If there is anyone in the state who could handle the above
matter, you are the individual-I would thank you for your
early reply
"Very truly, [Signed] T. C. Duncan."
Mr. Duncan brought action of libel against the Record Publishing Company and Mr. Robertson who furnished the letter to
the newspaper, claiming $50,000 damages. The jury after a very
short deliberation-the case went to the jury at 6 o'clock and the
judged was called from his residence and was back in the court
room at 6:30 to hear the verdict-gave the plaintiff the $50,000
*Professor of Law, Umversity of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North
Carolina. By arrangement with the author and the North Carolina Law
Review, this article is published simultaneously in the two law rcvicws.
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for which he asked. The lower court refused a new trial and the
supreme court of South Carolina has recently affirmed the result.'
The plaintiff alleged that the publication in connection with
certain extrinsic facts was susceptible of conveying the inference
that he was soliciting a bribe. The facts relied on were (1) that
the Canal Commission had power to settle a litigation then pending between the state of South Carolina and the Columbia Railway, Gas and Electric Company, (2) that Mr. Robertson owned
a controlling interest in that company, (3) that on the morning
of the publication-about a year after the date of the letter in
question-Mr. Duncan, rising to a point of personal privilege in
the Senate, had made a bitter attack upon Mr Robertson and the
press of Columbia. Senator Duncan's speech was vigorous and
scathing, alleging that Mr. Robertson was an octopus improperly
influencing the newspapers and dominating chambers of coininerce in order to persuade the Canal Commission to settle tile
litigation in question for the selfish purpose of protecting his own
interests.
The defense set up was that the publication was true, that it
was made in self defense and therefore privileged, and, in addition, the newspaper set up the privilege of fair comment. At
the trial the evidence was clear that the plaintiff was a man of
character and standing, the son of a bishop and actively engaged
in business and politics for many years. The defendant, Robertson, was a prominent business man of Columbia, president of a
leading bank which had absorbed a number of smaller banks,
and the owner of the controlling interest in the Columbia Railway,
Gas and Electric Company, furnishing the city with street cars,
gas and electric power. Mr. Robertson had at one time pur
chased the Columbia Record and had set up one of his employees
in charge of it who continued as owner and editor of the paper
The paper owed Mr. Robertson about $40,000 and owed the bank
about $56,000. Mr Robertson had been active in developing electric power and had been influential in keeping the competing
Southern Power Company out of Columbia. He had a month or
two before the trial changed his domicile to Maine where, as he
testified, he intended to retire, being worth at least $300,000, or,
as he said, "it is near enough for the purpose of this case." As to
the letter in question, Mr. Duncan testified that he was requesting a bona fide loan upon proper security Both Mr Robertson
'Duncan v. Record Publishing Co., (S.C. 1927) 143 S. E. 31.
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and the editor of the paper testified that they thought the letter
would subject Mr. Duncan to criticism and Mr. Robertson stated
that he was very much worried when he received the letter "because," as he testified, "I knew if I declined I would run the risk
of incurring the enmity of a member of the Canal Commission,
and if I made the loan I would make myself liable to be suspected
for trying to influence the commission." But there was no evidence beyond this of the purpose of the defendants to infer the
solicitation of a bribe and no other evidence of express malice oil
either hand, and they expressly disclaimed any defamatory purpose.
Nevertheless, the verdict indicates that the jury believed that
the defendants acted with actual malice, and the amount of the
verdict indicates that they gave something by way of punitive
damages. The plaintiff neither alleged nor proved any pecumary
loss, so that the damages were entirely for injury to reputation
and feelings.
It is natural that a case of such interest should involve mnanv
features but the present discussion will be limited to the following1. Extrinsic facts necessary to render words libelous.
2. Proving the truth of a libelous charge.
3. Privilege of self defense-provocation.
4. Suggested newspaper privilege of publishing true facts
concerning public officers.
I
EXTRINsIc FACTS NECESSARY TO RENDER WORDS LIBELOUS

At the very start of the Duncan Case, the trial judge was
faced with the problem of deciding whether there was a case to
submit to the jury On its face, the publication seemed innocent
enough. However, the plaintiff contended that it conveyed a defamatory inference in view of the extrinsic facts above mentioned.
Is the publication capable or susceptible of such an inference?
"The law is perfectly well settled. Before a question of libel
or slander is submitted to a jury, the court must be satisfied that
the words complained of are capable of the defamatory meaning
ascribed to them. That is a matter of law for the court. If thev
are so, and also of a harmless meaning, it is a question of fact
for a jury which meaning they did convey in the particular case.2
Stubbs, Ltd. v. Russell, [1913] A. C. 386, 393 Newell, Slander and
Libel, 4th ed., sec. 247 248, Commercial Publishing Co. v. Smith, (C.C.A.
6th. 1907) 149 Fed. 704 especially pp. 706, 707 where Lurton. J., says.
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A recent Colorado case 3 involved a number of newspaper
articles and cartoons charging the governor with a pardon orgy"most shocking pardon scandal in state's history"-"for months
rumors have been afloat that money and lots of it. has been responsible for the release of prisoners"-"a $30,000 slush fund is
working in Max's behalf, it is declared and his friends are boasting that the parole is assured. The money it is said, is being
scattered right and left." The trial court sustained a demurrer
to the complaint, but on appeal this was reversed, although it is
interesting that three dissenting judges agreed with the lower court
that the publications were not susceptible of a libelous interpretation as charging bribery or official corruption. The majority of the

court, however, believed that the publications should have been
submitted to the jury under the rule that where words used are
ambiguous in their import or may permit, in their construction.
connection or application, a doubtful or more than one interpreta-

tion, and in some sense be defamatory the question whether they
are such is for the jury
It is to be noted that the jury is not to determine which of
the two meanings was intended,4 although that way of stating the
rule is sometimes found,' but the jury is to say which of the two
meanings would be attributed to it by those to whom it is addressed or by whom it may be read.' A newspaper publication
"A publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed ti

the sense in which the readers to whom it is addressed would ordinarily
understand it. So the whole item, including display lines, should be read
and construed together, and its meaning and significance thus determined.
When thus read, if its meaning is so unambiguous as to reasonably bear
but one interpretation, it is for the judge to say whether that signification is defamatory or not. If. upon the other hand, it is capable of two
meanings, one of which would be libellous and actionable and the other
not, it is for the jury to say under all the circumstances surrounding its
publication, including extraneous facts admissible in evidence, which ( the
two meanings would be attributed to it by those to whom it is addressed
or by whom it may be read." Baker v. Warner, (1913) 231 U. S. 588,
34 S. C. R. 175, 58 L. Ed. 384 Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner. (1919)
250 U. S. 290, 39 Sup. Ct. 448, L. Ed. Peck v. Tribune Co., (1908)
214 U. S. 185, 29 Sup. Ct. 554, 53 L. Ed. 960 McCall v. Sustair, (1911)
157 N. C. 179, 72 S. E. 974 Elmore v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.. (1925)
189 N. C. 658. 127 S. E. 710.
3
Morley v. Pub. Co., (Colo. 1928) 268 Pac. 540.
4The actionable or innocent character of words does not depend on
the intention with which they were published. Pollock, Torts. 12th ed..
p. 252 Newell, Slander and Libel, 4th ed., sec. 264.
5
The trial judge in the Duncan Case stated in his charge that the
jury is to determine the sense in which words were published. but the
charge as a whole did not mislead the jury into a consideration of the
intention of the publishers. See McCall v. Sustair (1911) N. C 179,
72 S. E. 974, three to two decision on this point.
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must be measured by its natural and probable effect upon the
mind of the average lay reader.In the Duncan Case,8 Cothran, J., dissenting, argues that
the publication is incapable of the inference that the plaintiff was
soliciting a bribe, but that the worst construction possible is that
Mr. Duncan was using his new office to induce favorable action
upon his application for a loan, that while this is an indiscretion,
it is far from being the solicitation of a bribe and a violation of
the criminal laws of the state. But the province of the court is
to decide only whether there is a case to be submitted to the
jury The test for making that decision has already been statedin view of the extrinsic circumstances alleged in the complaint,
are the words reasonably capable or susceptible of the defamatory
inference alleged by the innuendo of the plaintiff. Such a possibility is present in the Duncan case, and the court was right in
allowing the case to go to the jury so that they might be informed
of the extrinsic facts and might draw the proper inference."
6Hulton and Co. v. Jones, [1910] A. C. 20, 79 L. J. K. B. 198, Hanson
v. Globe Newspaper Co., (1893) 159 Mass. 293, 34 N. E. 462 Washington
Post Co. v. Kennedy, (D.C. App. 1925) 3 F (2d) 207 all cases of libel
by the coincidence of the plaintiff having the same name as the subject
of the publication, Elmore v. Atlantic Coast Line, (1925) 189 N. C.
658, 127 S. E. 710" Powell v. Young, (Va. 1928) 144 S. E. 624.
-Morley v. Pub. Co.. (Colo., 19128) 268 Pac. 540, 542; Peck v. Tribune
Co., (1908) 214 U. S. 185, 29 Sup. Ct. 554, 53 L. Ed. 960.
8Duncan
v. Record Pub. Co., (S.C. 1927) 143 S. E. 31, 64-66.
9
Cases where extrinsic facts were necessary to render the publication
libelous: Powell v. Young, (Va., 1928) 144 S. E. 624 (additional facts
necessary to identify plaintiff as the subject of the libel) Sydney v.
McFadden, Newspaper Pub. Corp., (1926) 242 N. Y. 208, 151 N. E. 209.
(statement that Doris Keane was Fatty Arbuckle's latest lady love becomes
libelous upon showing that Doris Keane is a married woman) 11 Corn.
L. Qt. 568 40 Harv. L. Rev. 324 25 Mich. L. Rev. 551 Fletcher v.
Cincinnati Realty Co., (1926) 21 Ohio App. 422, 153 N. E. 213, (public
announcement that leading hotel refused to carry out contract for an
announced banquet held not libelous where no libelous reason given for
the refusal. It is clear that extrinsic facts might render such a publication
libelous). See note 12 Corn. L. Qt. 113 and numerous cases cited. Mo
rison v. Ritchie, (1902) 39 Scot. L. Rep. 432 (to include the name of
a woman as mother in a list of births becomes libelous in view of the
fact that many who read the notice knew that she had been married
only one month), Newell v. How, (1883) 31 Minn. 235, 17 N. W 383, (to
write to a concern to whom plaintiff was indebted asking to what extent
he was indebted to them for the purpose of preparing a financial register
was not libelous as imputing insolvency without some additional facts.
But a subsequent letter advising caution was libelous). McDermott v.
Union Credit Co., (1906) 76 Minn. 84, 78 N. W 967 (publication of the
name of a merchant in a list of delinquent debtors in connection with
extrinsic facts showing that such list is in effect a black list and imputes
bad credit, is libelous), Brown v. Rouillard, (1917) 117 Me. 55, 102
Atl. 701, (statement that plaintiff burned his buildings is actionable when
united by the hearers with facts carrying a charge of crime, as that house
was insured).
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The dissenting opinion was undoubtedly influenced by the
misconception that if a publication is not libelous on its face, but
only because of extrinsic facts, it is not "libelous per se" and
hence is not actionable unless special damages are shown.10 This
proposition results from a confusion of slander and libel. In the
law of slander, due to historical accident, three well-defined categories of oral defamation were recognized as "actionable per se.""
In all other cases, it was necessary to prove pecuniary loss.i 2
Consequently the expression "libelous per se" has a proper place
in our law Its meaning is clear, although it is subject to the
criticism that it is not reasonable to impose on the law of today
such archaic and narrow categories. But there is no place
for the expression "libelous per se" except as an alternative
for "actionable." In the law of libel, it is excess baggage and
results only in confusion.
The weight of authority and the better reasoning sustain
the view that special damages need not be shown in cases of
libel, even though the publication is defamatory only by virtue
Statutory provisions have been adopted in all code jurisdictions,
except Arizona and Connecticut, providing that it is not necessary to state
in the complaint any extrinsic facts for the purpose of showing the
application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter. N. C. Code 1927
sec. 542, Minn. G. S. 1923 (Mason's Minn. Stat. 1927) sec. 9275. Such
provision does not obviate the necessity of setting out extrinsic facts to
show that an apparently harmless statement was in fact defamatory
Ten
Broeck v. Journal Printing Co., (1926) 166 Minn. 173, 207 N. W 497
Carr v. Sun Printing Assoc., (1904) 177 N. Y. 131, 69 N. E. 288 Clark,
The Complaint, 5 N. C. L. Rev. 101, 214, 216, 217
iOThis is the view adopted by the dissenting opinion i'Svdrie" v. Nc
Fadden Newspaper Pub. Co., (1926) 242 N. Y. 208, 151 N. E. 209. Ac
cord, Ten Broeck v. Journal Printing Co., (1926) 166 Mienn. 173, 207
N. W 497 Wiley v. Okla. Press Pub. Co., (1925) 106 Okla. 52, 233 Pac.
244 Peck v. Pub. Co., (Or. 1927) 259 Pac. 307 Rowan v. Gazette Printing Co.. (1925) 74 Mont. 326, 239 Pac. 1039; Fry v. McCord, (1895) 95
Tenn. 678, 33 S. W 568 Tommi v. Cevasco, (1896) 114 Cal. 266, 46 Pac.
103 Tower v. Crosby, (1925) 214 App. Div. 392, 212 N. Y S. 219.
"lIn the struggle of the common law courts for supremacy over the
spiritual courts, jurisdiction of three classes of cases was assumed. This
is the basis for the following classification of cases slanderous per se
A. Words imputing the commission of an indictable offense involving moral
turpitude or infamous punishment. B. Words inputm a contagious
disease which would cause person to be excluded from society (principally
venereal disease)
C. Words conveying charge of unfitness, dishonesty
or incompetence in an office of profit, trade or profession, in short, words
which tend to prejudice a man in his calling.
Words not falling strictly within these three categories are only ac
tionable upon proof of pecuniary loss. Pollock, Torts, 12th ed. p. 238
Newell, Slander and Libel, 4th ed. sec. 20" note 14 Cal. L. Rev. 61, 62.
12
Deese v. Collins, (1926) 191 N. C. 749, 133 S. E. 92, defendant
falsely stated that plaintiff (a white man) had negro blood in his veins.
See numerous cases in Newell, Slander and Libel, 4th ed., pp. 67-70.
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of extrinsic facts.13

Where the meaning of written or printed

words is clear and unambiguous and is alleged to come within
the broad definition of libel as "tending to expose a person to
ridicule, contempt, hatred or degradation of character," it is
well settled that words are either actionable per se, without
proof of a pecuniary loss, or are not libelous at all."
There is
no good reason for using a different rule where the written or
printed words are ambiguous

and are

rendered clear,

to

the

satisfaction of court and jury, by proper innuendo and explanatory circumstances.1 5 The gist of defamation is injury to reputation.

Consequently, it was not necessary

for the plaintiff in

the Duncan Case to claim any pecuniary loss.

Ii
PROVING THE TRUTH OF A LIBELOUS CHARGE
"The greater the truth, the greater the libel" was the maxiim
that prevailed in criminal

prosecutions of libel until

the Fox

Libel Act of 1792. Since then, truth has been a defense to a
criminal charge provided it was published in good faith and for
justifiable ends, 6 and, in several states, truth alone is a valid
1 7
defense to a criminal charge.
' 3 Sydney v. McFadden Newspaper Pub. Corp. (1926) 242 N. Y. 208.
151 N. E. 209" 40 Harv. L. Rev. 324 25 Mich. L. Rev. 551 Morrison v.
Ritchie and Co., (1902) 39 Scottish L Rep. 432; Erwin v. Record Pub.
Co., (1908) 154 Cal. 79, 97 Pac. 21, Hughes v. Samuels, (1916) 170 Iowa
1077 159 N. W 589 Kee v. Armstrong, (1916) 75 Okla. 84, 182 Pac.
494 Pentuff v. Park, (1927) 194 N. C. 146, 138 S. E. 616 Kirkland v.
Constitution Pub. Co., (Ga. App., 1928) 144 S. E. 821. In the cases where
a publication states that the plaintiff is colored wl ereas he is actually
white, the decisions are unanimous in holding the publication libelous without showing special damages. Flood v. News and Courier Co., (1905) 71
S. C. 112, 50 S. E. 637 Upton v. Times-Democrat Pub. Co., (1900) 104 La.
141, 28 So. 970; Pollock, Torts, 12th ed., pp. 236-238 Odgers, Outline
of Law of Libel 3, 1 Street Foundations of Legal Liability 295.
14 King v. Lake, (1670) Hardres 470; Cohen v. N. Y. Times Co., (1911)
74 Misc. Rep. 618, 132 N. Y. S. 1 Solverson v. Peterson, (1885) 64 Wis.
198, 25 N. W 14 Paul v. Auction Co., (1921) 181 N. C. 1, 105 S. E. 881
Libel and Slander 36 C. J. sec. 3, for collection of cases.
15 To this effect, see note, (1926) 14 Calif. L. Rev. 61, discussing Wiley
v. Okla. Press Pub. Co., (1925) 106 Okla. 52, 233 Pac. 224.
' 6 England. 6 and 7 Vict. c. 96, sec. 6 California, Pen. Code 1909, sec.
251 Iowa, Const. art. 1, sec. 7 Minnesota G. S. 1923, (Mason's Statutes).
secs. 9904, 10113 New York, Const. art. 1, sec. 8, South Carolina, Const.

art. 1, sec. 21, Virginia, Code 1904, sec. 3375. For complete list. see Hale.
Law of Press 59, n.

"North

Carolina, Consol. Stat., sec. 4638,

Indiana. Const. art. 1.

sec. 10- Missouri, Const., art. 2, sec. 14. For complete list, see Hale, Law
of Press 59. n.
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In civil cases, from early times, truth has been a complete
defense.1 8 There is a social interest in the free communication of
truth. No right to damages, therefore, can be founded on a
publication of the truth. The reason for this is said to be
"not because any merit is attached by the law to the disclosure
of all truth in season and out of season, but because of the demerit
attaching to the plaintiff if the imputation is true, whereby lie
is deemed to have no ground of complaint for the fact being
communicated to his neighbors. It is not that uttering truth always
party
carries its own justification, but that the
1 9 law bars the other
of redress which he does not deserve."
Yet the criminal law view, which requires good faith and
justifiable ends, has much to commend it, and we are not surprised to find it followed in some jurisdictions, even in civil
cases. There are a number of judicial decision, in addition
to constitutional and statutory provisions, holding that one who
speaks the truth is not absolutely protected, but that publication
of the truth is conditionally privileged depending on the good
faith of the publisher. 20 The publication must not only be true,
but the publisher must act with good motives and for justifiable
ends.
In Hutchtns v. Page,2 the defendant was held liable in an
action of libel for posting notices in the newspapers, advertising
sales of property for delinquent taxes, in addition to posting
notices in two or more public places as he was qualified to do as
tax collector by virtue of statute. The court said,
"However the law may be elsewhere, it is well settled in this
state that the truth is not always a defense to an action on the
There
case to recover damages for the publication of a libel.
may be some cases where the occasion renders, not only the motive, but the truth of the communication immaterial."
183 Blackstone Com., 125, 126, Foss v. Hildreth, (1865) 10 Allen
(Mass.) 76 Castle v. Houston, (1877) 19 Kan. 417 27 Am. Rep. 127

Thompson v. Pioneer Press Co., (1887) 37 Minn. 285, 33 N. W 856, Nixon
v. Dispatch Printing Co., (1907) 101 Minn. 309, 112 N. W 258 1-lenderson v. Fox, (1889) 83 Ga. 233, 9 S. E. 839; note (1909) 31 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 132, 133, 134, containing exhaustive list of cases.
19Pollock, Torts, 12th ed., p. 260.
2oHutchins v. Page, (1909) 75 N. H. 215, 72 Ati. 689, 31 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 132, Burkhart v. N. Am. Co., (1906) 214 Pa. 38, Atl. 410" Illinois,
in all trials for libel, both civil and crminal,
Const., art. 2, sec. 4, "
the truth, when published with good motives and for justifiable ends, shall
be a sufficient defense." This section is typical of similar statutory or
constitutional provisions in Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, West Vir
ginia. Compare Star Pub. Co. v. Donahoe, (Del. 1904) 58 Ati. 513.
2lHutchins v. Page, (1909) 75 N. H. 215, 72 Atl. 689, 31 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 132.
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New Hampshire is one of the states, mentioned above, where
the publication of truth is only privileged if done "in good
faith, for a justifiable purpose, and with a belief, founded on
reasonable grounds, of its truth."
The truth must be as broad as the charge. The libel must
be shown to be substantially true in every material matter The
gist, the sting, of the charge must be answered. Where the
innuendo imputes to the facts a particular charge, it is necessary
not only to prove the truth of the facts, but also the truth of
the imputed charge.22 In such a case, the libel is something more
than the published material, and that something more must be
justified.
"The plea of justification is not sustained unless the evidence goes to prove .every element
essential to the truth of the
2 charge imputed to the plaintiff."

Julian v. Kansas City Star Co. 4 may be used to illustrate.
The words complained of were that the plaintiff, who had been
a member of the legislature, "did well in a legislative way" The
innuendo was that the words imputed bribery It was held that
the words were capable of that meaning and that it was a question
for the jury as to whether they were used and understood in
that sense, that, if the jury so found, the defendant would have
to prove their truth in that sense in order to justifv There
was a strong dissent on the ground that the words were not
fairly susceptible of the construction placed upon them.
In Warner v. Clark,2 5 the defendants sent a circular letter
to their customers, stating, among other things, that "Mr. Warner
formerly in our employ, is no longer so. Our friends and customers will kindly note the above and give Mr. Warner no recognition on our account." The plaintiff was held to be entitled to
the verdict in his favor on the ground that the letter insinuated
dishonesty and unreliability The defendants set up the truth
of the facts in the letter, but it was held that it would be necessary to prove the truth of the libelous imputation as well.
So in the Duncan Case, although every statement was true,
22
Duncan v. Record Pub. Co., (S.C. 1927) 143 S. E. 31 Thomson
v. Pioneer Press Co., (1887) 37 Minn. 285, 33 N. W 856- Newell, Slander
and Libel, 4th ed., sec. 699; note (1909) 31 L. R. A. (N.S.) 132, 136,
137 23140 and cases cited.
Ferguson v. Houston Press Co., (Tex. Cir. App., 1927) 1 S. W (2d)
387 393.
24
Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., (1907) 309 Mo. 35, 107 S. W 596.
-5Warner v. Clark, (1893) 45 La. Ann. 863, 13 So. 203, 21 L. R. A.
502 (1893).
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and the author ot the letter was the plaintiff himself, the defendant had to establish the truth of the libelous charge-the solicitation of a bribe.
It has been suggested that the recognition of the right of
privacy will offer at least a partial escape from the doctrine that
In Brents
truth is a complete defense in a civil action of libel.2
v Morgan, 27 the defendant posted a sign five feet by eight feet
in the show window of his garage
"Notice. Dr. W R. Morgan owes an account here of $49.67
And if promises would pay an account, this account would have
been settled long ago. This account will be advertised as long
as it remains unpaid."
The plaintiff recovered substantial damages on the ground
that his right of privacy had been invaded. This was clone without
any regard for the truth of the statement published and in face
of a Kentucky statute making truth an absolute defense in a civil
action for libel. Such a recognition of a right of privacy in disclosures of personal affairs, sidesteps the rule that truth is a
defense to libel. It almost brings us back to the old maxin,
"The greater the truth, the greater the libel." Under the Kentucky decision, it may be that truth as a defense in libel actions
is to be limited to matters of public interest. If Mr Duncan's
letter in the principal case could be regarded as strictly private,
with no public concern in its publication, then it might be argued
that the defendants were guilty of an intentional invasion of the
plaintiff's private affairs.
The Duncan Case is interesting in another aspect because
of the South Carolina rule on the degree of proof, stated in the
instructions of the trial judge, and affirmed by the supreme court,
as follows
"Where a libelous publication consists of making a charge of a
crime, and a party seeks to justify, on the ground that the charge
is true, the law of this state requires him to prove the truth of his
charge-that is to say, the truth of the crime-beyond a reasonable
doubt, just as in criminal cases."
This is the English rule, 28 but seems to have little following
in the United States. Since the rule requiring proof of a criminal
charge beyond a reasonable doubt was meant for the protection of
a person on trial for the commission of a crime, it should not
26
27Note (1928) 1 So.
Brents v. Morgan,
8

Calif. L. Rev 293, 296.
(Ky. 1927) 299 S. W 967
2 Cook v. Field, (1788) 3 Esp. 133 Newell, Slander and Libel, 4th
ed., sec. 698 Burckhalter v. Coward, (1881) 16 S. C. 435.
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apply to an affirmative defense in a civil action where no criminal
29
punishment is involved.
III
THE PRIVILEGE OF SELF DEFENSE-PROVOCATION

"The law of defamation stands apart
is not a law requirIng care and caution in a greater or less degree, but is a law of
absolute responsibility qualified by absolute exceptions.""0
"Certain occasions excepted, a man defames his neighbor at his
peril." 3' 1
The exceptional occasions are said to be privileged, i. e.,
the law, on a balance of interests, leaves its hands off. What
would ordinarily be actionable is permitted on such occasions.
The law of defamation recognizes various sorts of privileges-of
judicial and legislative proceedings, of communication between
persons having a common interest in the subject matter, of artistic
criticism, etc. Thus Senator Duncan, speaking in the South
Carolina legislature, was not responsible to anybody for what
he said. Legislative proceedings are absolutely privileged, even
when there is malice.3 - Most privileges are merely qualified or
conditional in the absence of malice. They are the occasions
where good faith is called for to excuse a publication which would
otherwise be actionable.
The reply of the defendants to Senator Duncan s attack in the
principal case raises the question of whether there is such a
privilege as self defense.
It is recognized by Odgers 3 and
34
Newell and by a number of judicial decisions."
ALprivilege of
29Newell, Slander and Libel, 4th ed., sec. 698 Beck v. Bank, (1912)
161 N. C. 201, 76 S. E. 722; Hadley v. Tinnan, (1915) 170 N. C. 84, 86
S. E. 1017 Anderson v. Savannah Press Pub. Co., (1897) 100 Ga. 454.
28 S. E. 216; Wilcox v. Moore, (1897) 69 Minn. 49, 71 N. W 517 Barfield v. Britt, (1854) 47 N. C. 41, 62 kin. Dec. 190" 5 Wigniore. Evidence.
sec. 2498, n. 5.
"oPollock, Torts, 12th ed., p. 565, note (a).
31
Pollock, Torts, 12th ed., p. 631, note (k). See article by Jerenah
Smith, Jones v. Hulton, Three Conflicting Views. 60 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 468.
3"State constitutions contain provisions similar to that of the U. S.
Const, art. 1, sec. 6, cl. 1, that for any speech or debate in either house.
members of Congress shall not be questioned in any place. The English
Bill of Rights, 1 Win. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2, contains a similar provision.
See Pollock, Torts, 12th ed., p. 264 Newell, Slander and Libel. sec.. 352.
There is an interesting discussion by Field, Constitutional Privileges of
Legislators, 9 MICNESOTA LAW REVIEW 442 in which the author argues
that the privilege should not be absolute, but conditional upon the exercise of good faith.
3"Odgers, Slander and Libel, sec. 229.
34Newell, Slander and Libel, sec. 429.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

self defense is somewhat incongruous as it seems to call for a

lie to answer a lie.

Of course, if the answer is true, the defend-

ant may justify the defamation, and no privilege is needed. It is
when the defamatory answer is false that the defendant seeks to
claim a privilege of self defense.
The mere fact that the plaintiff has previously defamed the
defendant is no defense to an action of libel or slander, although
it may result in a mitigation of damages. 3
In Izne v. King,"
the defendant published an article charging the plaintiff, a lawyer
with conspiracy to slander
The jury found that the charge was
not true and assessed the damages at $1500. This was affirmed
by the North Carolina supreme court. The lower court refused
to submit to the jury an issue whether the article was published
in self defense and whether it was published in good faith and
without malice. Such refusal was held to be proper, the court
saying,
"The defendant could have proven in defense the truth of
his article, but not that it was in reply to an attack made upon
him. Two wrongs do not make a right. Nor could he show good
faith and the absence of malice as a defense for the article which
is libelous per se. These are matters which could be urged in
mitigation of damages only
The law allows a man to repel
a libelous charge by a denial or an explanation. He has a qualified
privilege to answer the charge, but it must be truthful, and not defamatory of his assailant."38
It is clear that if the answer must be truthful, that is a
sufficient defense, and the existence of a privilege is thereby
denied. But the court goes on to state the rule, as announced
by the Michigan court.
36Duncan v. Record Pub. Co., (1925) 131 S. C. 483, 127 S. E. 606
s.c., (1927) 143 S. E. 31, Shepherd v. Baer, (1902) 96 Md. 152, 53 Atl.
790" Brewer v. Chase, (1899) 121 Mich. 526, 80 N. W 575 Smurthwaite
v. News Pub. Co., (1900) 124 Mich. 377 83 N. W 116 Preston v. Hobbs,
(1914) 161 App. Div. 363. 146 N. Y. S. 419" Ivie v. King, (1914) 167
N. C. 174, 83 S. E. 339" Chafin v. Lynch, (1887) 83 Va. 106, 1 S. E. 803.
Indiana refused to recognize any privilege which would permit setting off
one tort against another, either as a defense or in mitigation of damages.
See DePew v. Robinson, (1883) 95 Ind. 109. In Clark v. McBame. (1923)
299 Mo. 77 252 S. W 428, a letter by members of the law faculty of a
state university in reply to a newspaper article by the plaintiff in regard
to the latter's dismissal from the faculty was held privileged because
necessary to protect defendants interests and because the affairs of a state
university
are a proper subject for comment.
38
6Sternberg Mfg. Co. v. Miller, etc., Mfg. Co., (C.C.A. 8th., 1909)
170 Fed. 298, 18 Ann. Cas. 69 and note Stewart v. Minn. Tribune Co.,
(1889) 41 Minn. 71, 42 N. W 787 Ivie v. King, (1914) 167 N. C. 177
83 S.37E. 339.
1vie v. King, (1914) 167 N. C. 174, 83 S. E. 339.
38(1914) 167 N. C. 174, 177 83 S. E. 339, 340.
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"The law justifies a man in repelling a libelous charge by a
denial or an explanation. He has a qualified privilege to answer
the charge, and if he does so in good faith, and what he publishes
is fairly an answer, and is published for the purpose of repelling
the charge, and not with malice, it is privileged, though it be false
The court will deterlmne whether the occasion is one which justifies such publication; but the question of good faith-i.e. malice-The thing published must be something in the
is for the jury.
nature of an answer, like an explanation or denial. What is said
must have some connection with the charge that is sought to be
repelled." 39
It is to be noted that although every man has a right to
defend his character against false aspersion,'40 the reply must be
pertinent and fairly arising from the charge and not malicious.
The limitations of the privilege are implicit in the words "self
defense." Just as one who is threatened with physical violence
may defend himself with such force as is necessary to repel the
attack, so one whose character is defamed may impugn his opponent's veracity and give his own version of the matter in dispute,
provided he acts in good faith and does no more than is reasonably
necessary to uphold his own reputation. He must not intrude
unnecessarily into the private life of his attacker."
This privilege of self defense, like all qualified privileges,
may be lost by too wide a publication. The method or extent
of publishing the answer may exceed or destroy the privilege.
An attack made orally before a few people does not call for
a reply in the newspaper or over the radio. The reply must be
aimed at reaching the audience which heard the attack. In Adam
v. Ward,'2 the plaintiff made a speech in the House of Commons
defamatory of an army general, who referred the matter to the
Army Council. The defendant, as secretary of the A.rmy Council.
wrote a letter to the general vindicating the latter and making
defamatory statements of the plaintiff. This letter was given
to the press to be published. The House of Lords held that the
publication of the letter was not too wide, Lord Dunedin saying
"The ambit of the contradiction should be spread so wide, as. if
possible, to meet the false accusation wherever it went. Do what
you will, the stem chase after a lie that has got the start is apt
to be a long one." 43
39
Brewer v. Chase, (1899) 121 Mich. 526, 80 N. W 575. 577 [Italics
ours.]
4oNewell, Slander and Libel, 4th ed., sec. 429.
4Newell,
Slander and Libel, 4th ed., sec. 429.
423Adam v. Ward, [19171 A. C. 309.
4 Adam v. Ward, [1917] A. C. 309, 324.
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The charge of the trial judge in the Duncan Case, when
taken as a whole, recognized this privilege of self defense, both
as a bar to the action and in mitigation of damages. This was
approved by the South Carolina supreme court, 4 following its
first decision in the Duncan Case,45 where the issue was directly
raised by the action of the lower court in striking out a special
plea that the matter complained of was published to explain and
deny charges which the plaintiff had made against defendants in
a speech in the legislature. The lower court based its action
on the ground that the plaintiff's speech was privileged. On
appeal it was held that the defense was a proper one and should
have been allowed to stand. Thus the application of the privilege
of self defense to the Duncan Case is recognized. The letter was
published as an answer to the plaintiff's vituperative attack. Just
because the plaintiff's own speech was privileged from any legal
action, it does not follow that it could not be refuted. Otherwise
every man's reputation is at the mercy of members of any legislature. Senator Duncan's speech called for reply
Was the
publication of the letter in question a proper answer or was it
an unnecessary intrusion into Senator Duncan's private affairs
Were the defendants acting in good faith or were they influenced
by malice toward the plaintiff? These very difficult questions
had to be answered by the jury, and the verdict was for the
plaintiff.
Even if self defense should not be accorded the place of
a privilege, there are many occasions when the plaintiff's defaimatory attack should be considered as a provocation of the defendant's reply, and such provocation should go toward the mitigation
of damages. The law makes allowance for what is done in anger
46
and in the heat of passion.
IV
SUGGESTED NEWSPAPER PRIVILEGE OF PUBLISHING TRUE
CONCERNING

FACTS

PUBLIC OFFICERS

"The process of continual readjustment between the needs
of society and the protection of individual rights is nowhere more
**Duncan v. Record Pub. Co., (S.C. 1927) 143 S. E. 31, 55-57
45Duncan v. Record Pub. Co., (1925) 131 S. C. 483, 127 S. E. 606,
commented upon in 24 Mich. L. Rev. 74. See also g MINNESOTA LAW REviEw 623, discussing a case in which there was a mutual exchange of approbrious ephithets.
46Stewart v. Minn. Tribune Co., Co., (1889) 41 Minn. 71, 42 N. W 787
Ivie v. King, (1914) 167 N. C. 174, 83 S. E. 339; Duncan v. Record Pub.
Co., (S.C., 1927) 143 S. E. 31 Newell, Slander and Libel, 4th ed., sec. 429.
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conspicuous than in the history of the law of defamation. If we
look back to the time when the law defining that offense became
substantially settled, we find prevailing a conception of such
relative rights which is in many respects the antithesis of that
which prevails today. Yet the law defining the affirmative offense,
with its rigorous presumptions of falsity, malice, and damage,
remains practically unchanged. It seems to have been thought
that the vast increase in facility and area of communication, resulting from the use of the post, the telephone, the telegraph, and
the modern printing press, justified the stringent principles of
the law vwhich had been formulated before such methods of communication were dreamed of. The development of the law, in accommodation to this vast change in the means of communication.
has been in the direction of enlarging the scope of those principles
of immunity, or privilege, some perception of which was coeval
with the beginnings of the law upon the subject. Certain fundamental considerations have guided this growth. Immunity in defamation implies some freedom in the publication of matter which
proves to be mistaken or false. It follows, necessarily, that persons defamed must suffer without remedy The plainest principles of justice require, therefore, that immunity should be granted
only within such limits as can be justified upon reasonable
grounds.47
Every person has a right to comment on matters of public
interest and general concern, provided he does so fairly and with
an honest purpose. 48 Affairs of government, activities of public
officials and qualifications of candidates for office are privileged
subjects of discussion because everyone in a given community
in theory at least, is concerned with the conduct of his public
servants.49 A search through the advance sheets of the past year
shows that a preponderance of the libel cases involved comment or
criticism of public officials or candidates for office.50 All of these
cases reaflirm the general rule that reasonable and fair comment
and criticism, as distinguished from allegation of fact, of the acts
and conduct of a public officer are qualifiedly privileged.
47

Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion. 23 Harv. L. Rev. 413.
Pollock, Torts, 12th ed., p. 255, Newell, Slander and Libel, 4th ed..
sec. 477 11 MixxFsoTA LAW REvIEW 474. See cases in note 50.
49 Jones, Interest and Duty in Relation to Qualified Privilege, 22 Mich.
L. Rev. 437 439.
5
OFerguson v. Houston Press Co., (Tex. Cir. App. 1927) 1 S. \V (2d)
387, Eva v. Smith, (Cal. 1928) 264 Pac. 803, Jenkins v. Taylor, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928) 4 S. W (2d) 656 Houston Press v. Smith, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1928) 3 S. W (2d) 900; Peck v. Coos Bay Times Publishing Co.,
(Wash. 1927) 259 Pac. 307 State v. Cox, (Mo. 1927) 298 S. W 837
Jones v. Express Pub. Co., (Cal. 1927) 262 Pac. 78 Morley v. Post Pub.
Co., (Colo. 1928) 268 Pac. 540.
8
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"The conduct of public officers being open to public criticism,
it is for the interest of society that their acts may be freely published with fitting comment or strictures." 5' 1 "It is not only the
privilege but the duty of every citizen and every newspaper to
fairly and impartially
criticise the faults and misconduct of pub'2

lic officers.

In general, the facts which are stated as the basis of any
privileged comment or criticism must be true." The privilege of
fair comment does not extend to untrue statements of fact. In
England, it is customary to plead fair comment as follows
"In so far as the words are statements of fact, the same are true
in substance and in fact, and in so far as they consist of comment
they are fair and bona fide comment upon a matter of Iblic
interest." 54
This is called the "rolled up" plea. It is necessary because
comment must be made on accurate facts. "If a defendant cannot
show that his comments contain no misstatements of fact, he
cannot prove a defense of fair comment." 5
In cases dealing with candidates for public office, there is
a split of authority in the United States in fair comment cases
as to the necessity that the facts stated be true. The English rule
is generally followed, the leading case being Post Publishing Co.
v.Hallam." It was held by Taft, then circuit judge, that while
criticism and comment are privileged, if made in good faith, yet
false allegations of fact are not privileged, although made in the
best of faith. To hold otherwise will drive honorable and worthy
men from politics. "The privilege should always cease where
the sacrifice of the individual right becomes so great that the
public good to be derived from it is outweighed. '5 7 However
there is strong authority holding that this qualified privilege may
51
Eva
52

v. Smith, (Cal. 1928) 264 Pac. 803, 805.
Jones v. Express Pub. Co., (Cal. 1927) 262 Pac. 78, 84.
53Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 415
Newell, Slander and Libel, 4th ed., sec. 483. See note 7 Com. L. 2, 389,
discussing Hymans v. Press Pub. Co., (1922) 199 App. Div. 609, 192 N. Y.
5, 4754 publication of slacker lists erroneously containing plaintiffs' name.
Note 159 Law Times 423, discussing Sutherland v. Stopes, [1925]
A. C.55 47
Digby v. Financial News, [1907] 1 K. B. 502, 507
56
Post Pub. Co. v. Hallam, (C.C.A. 6th. 1893) 59 Fed. 530" Burt v.
Advertiser Co., (1891) 154 Mass. 238, 28 N. E. 1, Hall v. Ewing, (1917)
140 La. 907 74 So. 190" Ferguson v. Houston Press Co., (Tex. Civ. App.
1927) 1 S.W (2d) 387 Jenkins v. Taylor, (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) 4 S.W
(2d) 656, State v. Cox, (Mo. 1927) 298 S. W 837 Arizona Pub. Co.
v. Harris, (1919) 20 Ariz. 446, 181 Pac. 373, Bingham v. Gaynor, (1911)
203 N. Y. 27 96 N. E. 84 Pattangall v. Mooers, (1918) 113 Me. 412.
94 Ati. 561, L. R. A. 1918E 14 and note.
57 Post Pub. Co. v. Hallam, (C.C.A. 6th, 1893) 59 Fed. 530, 540.
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extend to false statements of fact concerning public officers if
made without malice and on probable cause. 8 In the leading
case 59 sustaining this view, it is argued that the real issue is good
faith and -bad faith. If the publication is in good faith, then the
publication of facts, which prove to be false, does not destroy the
privilege. The public interest is paramount and without this rule,
the press is helpless to open up on crooks. In practice, one rule
seems to work about as well as the other.
The privilege of fair comment seems to include the suggested
privilege of newspapers to publish true facts in matters of public
concern. The privilege of fair comment and criticism, when.
based on admittedly true facts, is now well established.60 If a
newspaper may publish fair comments in addition to true facts,
it seems to follow that the true facts may be published without
comment. Is the defendant to be penalized for doing less than
he might have done under the emsting privilege?
In the Duncan Case, no comment is made at all. The facts
stated are literally true in every detail. If the privilege of fair
comment does not apply because there is entire absence of
comment, then the law should recognize a new privilege-that of
a newspaper to publish true facts concerning public officers. As
indicated above, the concept of immunity or privilege has been
the growing p6int in the law of defamation. The situation illustrated by the Duncan Case seems to require an absolute immunty
It is the only way to give proper protection to a newspaper which
is concerning itself with the conduct of public officers. In the
Duican Case, the jury found malice, and that finding would have
negatived any conditional privilege. It is probably true that the
jury was confused by the standard definitions of malice in the
charge of the trial judge, which confused legal malice, that fictitious presumption in every libel case, with actual malice or bad
faith. While we cannot escape the feeling that the defendants
were harshly treated in the Duncan Case, yet, in view of the
present state of the law, the blame, if any, seems to fall on the
jury. Even a recognition of a conditional privilege in this case
would probably not have affected the verdict.
58

Coleman v. MacLennan, (1908) 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281, Salinger

v. Cowles, (1923) 195 Iowa 873, 191 N. W 167, Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co., (1925) 163 Minn. 226, 203 N. W 974 Lewis v. Carr, (1919) 178
N. C. 578, 101 S. E. 97, falsehood of charge not sufficient to establish
malice.
5
9Coleman v. MacLennan, (1908) 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281, elaborate
opinion
by Burch, J.
6
oSee notes 48, 49, 50.
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What is needed in the law of libel to safeguard the public
as against the politician and the holder of public office is an absolute privilege rather than a conditional one. The suggested absolute privilege is narrow enough. It should apply only to newspapers. The printed page is more impersonal and permanent, and
the newspaper is the most important factor in the formation of
public opinion. The suggested privilege is further limited by its
subject matter-public officers and candidates for office. It is
also limited to the publication of true facts. The reader is free
to draw his own inferences. A newspaper should not be responsible under these limitations. How else can the public be protected against the politician? This is important because of a tendency today to throttle the public press by politicians who are
The suggested privilege is aimed at
afraid of being exposed.'
protecting the public interest. In case a newspaper publishes
true facts concerning a politician, the risk of defamatory inferences should fall on him. That is the price he must pay for being a servant of the people. The situation calls for an absolute
privilege because of the tendencies of juries to find malice too
easily, partly due to the confusion in the law of libel between legal
and actual malice. It must be remembered too that the plaintiff
can often practically take his choice of any county in the state
from which to draw the jury, since he may under usual rules of
venue, sue in any county where the newspaper circulates.
Such an absolute privilege swings the balance in favor of the
public interest, although individual hardship may occasionally result. This risk of injury to individuals, who happen to hold public office or are candidates for office, is more than offset by the
02
The
public advantage in being made aware of the true facts.
solution.
the
and
problem
Duncan Case suggests the
6
'There is some indication of this in Minnesota, Laws 1925, ch. 285.
held to be constitutional in State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, (1928) 174
Minn. 457 219 N. W 770. The decision seems to be correct, but the statengaged in the
ute which renders enjoinable as a nuisance "any person
a malicious, scandalous
business of regularly or customarily publishing
" shows a tendency which may become
and defamatory newspaper
dangerous to a free press.
62See Hallen, The Texas Libel Laws, 5 Tex. L. Rev. 335, 358, coimenting on Texas Pub. Laws, 1927 ch. 80 to the effect that the new law
creates an absolute privilege in newspapers in reporting what takes place
in judicial, legislative and public meetings.
An absolute privilege of the sort suggested in the text would probably violate the constitutional provisions in a number of states that truth
is not a defense unless accompanied by good motives and justifiable ends.
Where such constitutional provisions exist, the immunity could be conditional at least, and the jury could be left with the question of actual malice
under a charge which made the distinction with implied malice clear

